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Abstract 
In response to the expiration of the transitory restrictions imposed on agricultural land 
acquisitions by foreigners, governments in Central and Eastern Europe have introduced new 
rules governing land sales transactions. Since direct restrictions on foreign investors would 
now be illegal under the EU treaties, the desire to preserve the status quo has resulted in 
limited access to land not only for foreigners but also for some groups of domestic investors. 
In this study, we analyze land market regulations adopted in Latvia, Poland, Romania, and 
Slovakia. We argue that these new regulations create particularized or non-inclusive 
institutions. We also argue that the new land market regulations will likely result in reduced 
competition and thus affect land prices, sale transactions, and access to land. The market 
impacts are different across the four countries due to the heterogeneity in the newly adopted 
regulations.  
Key words: land acquisitions, land regulations, particularized institutions, Central and 
Eastern Europe  
JEL classification: Q15, D02 
1. Introduction
Upon joining the European Union (EU) in 2004 and 2007, New Member States (NMS) from 
Central and Eastern Europe
2
 were granted a possibility of introducing transitory restrictions
on agricultural land acquisitions by foreigners from EU Member States (European 
Commission 2014). The transitional measures were adopted to allow land markets to adjust 
gradually to competitive pressures from the single EU market. These pressures primarily 
originated from substantial differences in agricultural land prices between NMS and Old 
Member States (OMS)
3
 (e.g., Swinnen et al. 2013).
1
 We are grateful for comments from seminar participants at the European Commission. This report is based on 
Ciaian et al. (2016). The authors are solely responsible for the content of the paper. The views expressed are 
purely those of the authors and may not in any circumstances be regarded as stating an official position of the 
European Commission. 
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 Throughout the text, the term New Member States (NMS) refers to the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia (joined the EU in May 2004), as well as Bulgaria and Romania 
(joined in January 2007). 
3
 Old Member States (OMS) include Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, 
Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the UK.  
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The transitory measures expired in 2014 (in Poland in 2016). Subsequently, NMS 
governments introduced new regulations to govern national land markets. The objective of 
our report is to map these new land market regulations and analyze their potential impacts on 
farmland markets. In particular, we analyze to what extent these regulations limit access to 
land resources and create potential barriers constraining the optimal allocation of resources.  
We analyze land market regulations adopted in Latvia, Poland, Romania, and 
Slovakia. These four case studies are representative of the whole region as they allow us to 
capture significant heterogeneities in regional and socio-economic contexts that can be 
observed across NMS. The countries under study cover various geographical locations and 
exhibit different levels of the economic development, which implies that they potentially face 
a different demand for land from foreign and domestic non-agricultural investors. The 
structures of the agricultural sector and farmers’ lobby also differ in these countries due to a 
different legacy of the communist era. The analyzed countries also display substantial 
heterogeneity in terms of the role that land sales and land rental markets play for the local 
farmers. As a result, the four countries under investigation allow us to identify both 
similarities and differences in responses of NMS governments to the challenges related to the 
expiration of transitory measures which regulated their land sales markets after the accession 
to the EU in 2004/2007. 
As we show in this report, a common trend among many NMS was to preserve the 
status quo, that is, to maintain effective restrictions to the land acquisition by foreigners. 
Given that direct restrictions on foreign investments in the land would now be illegal under 
the EU treaties, the desire to preserve the status quo has resulted in limited access to land not 
only for foreign investors but also for some groups of domestic investors. As a consequence, 
the new regulations resulted in a non-level playing field, where the group of land market 
participants with easier access to land transactions is favored at the expense of other groups. 
We, therefore, argue that the new regulations governing land markets in the NMS under study 
could be viewed as an example of what the institutional economics literature describes as a 
limited access order (North et al. 2009); non-inclusive institutions (Acemoglu and Robinson 
2012), or particularized institutions (Ogilvie and Carus 2014). While each of these concepts 
has its distinctive features, they all put great emphasis on the fact that institutions can be 
classified according to their effect on the opportunities that individual agents/different social 
groups are given to participate in economic activities. There also seems to be a consensus that 
institutions encouraging economic participation by large proportions of people are more 
favorable to stimulating economic performance than institutions providing privileges only to a 
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relatively small subset of agents in the economy. The key role of distributional conflicts 
between different interest groups for the development of institutions and their impact on 
various socio-economic aspects is another important message emerging from the literature. 
These claims receive strong support in arguments advanced both in an early institutional 
economics literature (e.g., Commons 1924) as well as in more recent studies which use an 
institutional political economy approach (e.g., Obeng-Odoom 2013).  
In this report, we investigate the impacts which the new land regulations, viewed from 
that perspective, may bring about. As such, our work relates to the extensive literature 
studying the importance of land institutions for economic outcomes (e.g., Binswanger et al. 
1995; Sokoloff and Engerman 2000; Deininger and Feder 2001; Banerjee and Iyer 2005; 
Vollrath 2007). These studies provide ample evidence that the way land markets are 
organized exerts a significant impact not only on the agricultural productivity but also, and 
more generally, on the economic development. An important channel through which this 
impact might be transmitted relates to land distribution and land inequality in particular. We 
try to complement these contributions by analyzing the likely impact of governmental 
restrictions imposed on land transactions. This issue is important as state interventions in land 
markets may reduce land inequality (e.g., Piet et al. 2012), suggesting that an additional 
mechanism transmitting the impact of land institutions on the agricultural performance is 
needed. In addition, while the existing literature is mostly concerned with the historical 
analysis, our investigation focuses on institutional changes taking place now.  
Our work also relates to studies analyzing the functioning of land markets in the EU. 
On the one hand, we refer to the literature focusing on existing land market regulations (e.g., 
Ciaian et al. 2010; Latruffe et al. 2013; Swinnen et al. 2014a,b). While these studies improve 
our knowledge about the legislation governing land transactions in OMS and NMS before 
2014, the new regulations introduced in NMS are much less researched. On the other hand, 
our analysis is related to studies concerning the phenomenon of land grabbing (Kay et al. 
2015; van der Ploeg et al. 2015; Ciutacu et al. 2017). As argued in these studies, the process 
of an excessive land concentration, associated with a detrimental impact on farming and local 
communities, takes place not only in Africa or Latin America but also in Europe.
4
 Foreign 
land ownership is often mentioned as a key driver behind this phenomenon (TI 2013; EESC 
2015). Other line of research however, argues that foreign land acquisitions could promote the 
development of rural areas through attracting foreign investments, which could lead to a re-
                                                          
4
 These phenomena have been also raised in numerous reports by various non-governmental organizations (e.g., 
TI 2013; Ecoruralis 2014) and a study requested by the European Parliament (EP 2015).  
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cultivation of the abandoned land, a job growth, the improvement of working conditions of 
the agricultural labor, improved market access for farmers, and an increase in the agricultural 
export potential (Görgen et al. 2009; Swinnen and Vranken 2009, 2010). In this context, our 
study tries to contribute to the literature by reviewing the existing evidence of the foreign land 
ownership in NMS and discussing potential consequences of measures undertaken to restrict 
foreign investors’ opportunities to invest in land.  
2. Foreign land ownership in NMS 
While the four countries under study differ in various features, they share many 
commonalities as regards the foreign land ownership. First, in all four countries, experts, 
politicians, and officials seem to unanimously agree that land regulations—in place during the 
transitory period after the EU accession—aiming at restricting the foreign land ownership 
were not very effective (Swinnen and Vranken 2009). As a result, the share of land owned by 
the foreigners has increased (EP 2016; see also sections 3.1-3.5). Moreover, it is often the 
most productive farmland (not marginalized land) that is being acquired by foreigners (Buday 
et al. 2013; RL 2013; Pravda 2015; LSM 2017). 
Second, in all four countries it is difficult (if at all possible) to assess how much land 
foreigners really own (EP 2015). The figures from official statistics and unofficial sources 
greatly differ (Swinnen et al. 2014a,b). According to various research studies, media, or 
reports prepared for/by non-governmental organizations, the share of foreign land ownership 
(control) is much higher than reported by official sources (EP 2016). For example, in Poland 
these estimates range from 42 thousand hectares (less than 1% of the total agricultural area) 
for the whole country, as reported by the Ministry of the Interior, to 400 thousand hectares in 
just one region (almost 50% of the total agricultural area in this region) (TI 2013; SAO, 
2014).
5
 Similarly, for Romania, the estimates vary between 1 to 4 million hectares (i.e., 
between 7% to 28% of the total agricultural area) (RL 2011; 2013; Ecoruralis 2014; EP 2015). 
The estimates for Slovakia range between 40 thousand hectares to 200 thousand hectares (i.e., 
between 2% to 10% of the total agricultural area) (Aktualne 2013; Buday et al. 2013; 
Lazániová 2014; Pravda 2014; 2015). Finally, as regards Latvia, the available statistics seem 
to be comparably scattered, and it is estimated that in 2014 roughly 185 to 370 thousand 
hectares were controlled by foreign capital (i.e., 8% to 16% of the total agricultural area).  
The discrepancies between the official and unofficial statistics could be explained, at 
least partly, by the fact that foreigners could bypass existing regulations by purchasing land 
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 This concerns the region Zachodniopomorskie, which borders with Germany.  
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through locally registered companies (Swinnen et al. 2014a,b). Alternatively, the agricultural 
land could have been effectively taken over by foreigners through the use of a proxy (‘fake’ 
buyers), that is, farmers hired by foreigners to outbid other buyers and transfer the control of 
land to their patrons (TI 2013; EP 2015).  
Third, in all four countries, land prices increased considerably since accession to the 
EU. For example, over the period 2006-2014, the average price of the arable land increased 
from 700 EUR per ha to 2 300 EUR per ha in Latvia and from 2 400 EUR per ha to 7 700 
EUR per ha in Poland.
6
 In Romania, the average price increased from 1 200 EUR per ha to 4 
000 EUR, whereas in Slovakia from 1 000 EUR per ha to 3 700 EUR per ha (IERiGŻ var 
vol.). It is commonly argued that part of this phenomenon is attributable to the demand from 
foreign investors (EP 2015). 
The price increase notwithstanding, prices in NMS remain significantly below the 
levels observed in OMS, which is the fourth similarity that can be observed. In fact, price 
differences between NMS and OMS were not eliminated over the transitory period and persist 
(e.g., Swinnen et al. 2013). To illustrate this, notice that average land prices for the arable 
land in Germany in 2014 were 18 900 per ha,
7
 in Italy 20 000 EUR per ha, in Belgium 30 000 
per ha, whereas in the Netherlands they amounted to as much as 53 200 EUR per ha.
8
 The 
observed land price increase in the whole EU could be explained by a food price increase, a 
shift to land-based subsidy system in the EU, increasing urban pressures, and a general 
productivity growth (McCalla 2009; Ciaian and Kancs 2012; Michalek et al. 2014). Given this 
marked gap in land prices between NMS and OMS, in all countries under study, there is a 
widespread belief that local farmers are not able to compete with new investors in bidding for 
land, as the majority of the investors come from OMS (RL 2011; TNI 2016). In Latvia, for 
example, largest foreign farmland owners are from Sweden (171 977 ha), Norway (48 104 
ha), Denmark (46 972 ha), Germany (30 550 ha), and Luxembourg (19 200 ha) (LSM 2017). 
Finally, in all four countries, it is observed that non-farming companies control some 
of the land owned by foreign investors. This observation is consistent with the argument 
advanced in the land grabbing literature (Kay et al. 2015, van der Ploeg et al. 2015, Ciutacu et 
al. 2017). Our study provides evidence that farmland grabbing is taking place in all four 
studied countries, as measured by the degree of foreign land ownership, the concentration of 
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 These data for Poland refer to the private turnover. Prices in land transactions involving state-owned land were 
about 1150 EUR per ha and 6400 EUR per ha, respectively.  
7
 This average is for both Western and Eastern Germany. Land prices in the west of Germany are much higher 
(about 28 000 EUR per ha) than in the east (12 200 EUR per ha). 
8
 It should be noted, however, that prices in Finland and France are more comparable to prices in NMS.  
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the land ownership in few hands, and the irregularities that often accompany numerous 
farmland transactions. In addition to the establishment of large corporate agricultural farms in 
NMS with the involvement of capital from OMS, recently the rush for land includes a new set 
of actors, such as financial investors consisting of banking groups, private equity companies, 
and investment funds that are traditionally not involved in the agricultural production (Buday 
et al. 2013; Ecoruralis 2014; Hajdu and Visser 2017). In Latvia, for example, out of ten 
largest foreign farmland owners, there is only one company involved in the agricultural 
production (LSM 2017). 
According to Kay et al. (2015), there are multiple drivers of farmland grabbing in 
NMS: significant farmland price differences between OMS and NMS that encourage 
speculation and ‘land artificialization,’ the unintended consequences of land reforms, land 
privatization and agricultural restructuring programs in NMS, the link between the control 
over farmland and CAP subsidy rent extraction, and other EU policies, such as bioenergy, 
climate and the environment. None of the four analyzed NMS fits in the mainstream ‘target 
countries’ (poor and land abundant), as identified in the land grabbing literature on Africa and 
Latin America (von Braun and Meinzen-Dick 2009, White et al. 2012). However, there are 
certain similarities with land grabbing processes taking place in other post-communist 
countries, for example, Ukraine, Russia, and Kazakhstan (Visser and Spoor 2011, Visser et al. 
2012). 
3. New land market regulations 
After the expiration of the transitory restrictions, land acquisitions in NMS were expected to 
be open to individuals and companies from any EU country. However, the reality is different. 
As a result of strong pressure coming mainly from farmer unions and often supported by the 
general public, NMS introduced new restrictions on land sales.
9
 Although the new regulations 
do not target directly foreign investors (as this would be in breach of EU treaties), their 
introduction was motivated by fears of a potential increase in competition from foreign 
buyers. These regulations aimed at maintaining the status quo established by transitory 
measures introduced at the time of the EU accession. While the regulations adopted in 
different NMS share some similarities, they also vary in several respects. In this section, we 
describe the new land market regulations introduced in four NMS countries under study: 
Romania, Slovakia, Poland, and Latvia. 
                                                          
9
 In response to the introduction of new regulations on land acquisition in NMS, the European Commission has 
initiated an infringement procedure under Article 258 of the EU Treaty as they restrict the free movement of 




The key change introduced by the new regulation in 2014 is granting the pre-emption right—
that is, the opportunity to buy land before it is offered on the open market—to particular 
groups of potential buyers. Pre-emption right holders include co-owners, tenants,
10
 adjacent 
landowners, and the state of Romania (Table 1).
11
 
A landowner intending to sell the agricultural land needs to request the local city hall 
to publish the sales offer. The request should include information on the seller, pre-emption 
right holders, and the land characteristics. The local authority has to display the sales offer at 
its premises and on its official website for 30 days. Further, the local authority is obliged to 
maintain the register of offers and to transmit the sales information to regional and central 
authorities, represented by the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development that in turn 
maintain the regional/central register and publish offers on their websites for 15 days. Pre-
emption right holders have 30 days from the date when the purchase offer is made public to 
express, in writing, their intention to acquire the agricultural land. If the land seller changes 
the offer within these 30 days, the whole procedure needs to be repeated from the beginning. 
If a pre-emption right holder expresses his interest in buying agricultural land and if 
the seller accepts the offer,
12
 the central or regional authority checks the legality of the 
transaction and emits an approval certificate that confirms the validity of the transaction and 
the purchase right of the pre-emption right holder. The central or regional authority also 
publishes the transaction approval certificate on its website. The regional authority emits 
certificates for land sales under 30 hectares, whereas the central authority emits certificates 
for transactions above 30 hectares. The transaction approval certificate is valid for six months 
from the date it is communicated to the seller. If pre-emption right holders do not express 
their intent to buy the offered land, the local authority issues a certificate that gives the seller 
freedom to offer the agricultural land on the open market.   
Additional conditions on sales transactions are imposed if the agricultural land is of 
archaeological importance or if it is located at country’s borders. Then the land seller needs to 
obtain a permit from the Ministry of Culture or the Ministry of National Defense. 
 Violations of the pre-emption right or procedures and requirements entail the absolute 
nullity of the sales transaction of the agricultural land. This nullity also implies that any sale 
                                                          
10
 An eligible tenant needs to have a written and registered rental contract for the land offered for sale. 
11
 The order given in the text represents the order of priority each group has in the case of multiple intends of 
purchase. Family relatives have priority over all the pre-emption right holders and are not subject to the new 
regulation; land transacted between family members does not need to follow the procedure established under the 
new regulation. 
12
 The seller has to sell the land to a pre-emptive right holder with the highest priority. 
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of the farmland at a price lower than the one mentioned in the initial sales offer or under more 
favorable terms is not recognized and makes the transaction legally not valid. Failure to 




The new land market regulation adopted in Slovakia in 2014 gives priority rights to buy the 
agricultural land to certain groups of potential buyers, whereas other groups are legally 
excluded from the possibility of acquiring the agricultural land (Table 1) (Drabik and 
Rajčániová 2014; Lazikova and Bandlerova 2014; and Lazikova et al. 2014).  
There are two groups of pre-emption right holders recognized by the new regulation. 
The first group includes family relatives, co-owners, and farmers; farmers need to conduct 
their activity at least three years in the cadastral zone where the offered land is located. The 
second group includes farmers (individual farms, farm labor, or companies) with permanent 
residence (headquarters) in Slovakia of at least ten years, conducting an agricultural activity 
for at least three years. Further, the second group is distinguished by where the agricultural 
activity is carried out – farmers from a neighboring village have priority to farmers from other 
locations. Young farmers (under 40) are exempted from the requirement of conducting the 
agricultural activity for at least three years before the transaction. However, they cannot sell, 
donate, or rent out the land for three years from the date of purchase. 
The seller is free to sell land to the first group of buyers; there are no special 
requirements that need to be fulfilled in this case. However, if the seller intends to sell land to 
the second group of buyers, (s)he is required to announce (free of charge) the offer for at least 
15 days in an online registry of agricultural land offers administered by the Ministry of 
Agriculture (the Registry, for short) and on a public board in the village where the land is 
located. The announcement has to include information about the seller, land, price, and the 
date until when purchase offers can be submitted. Pre-emption right holders need to express 
their interest in writing within the period established in the offer. The regulation establishes 
that pre-emption rights (for both groups) expire six months from the end date the 
announcement is published in the Registry.  
If none of the pre-emption right holders expresses their interest in acquiring the land, 
then the land can be sold to any buyer (not necessarily working in agriculture) from the 
European Union. However, the land can be sold only to individuals or companies with a 
permanent residence (or headquarters) in Slovakia of at least ten years but not earlier than six 
                                                          
13
 RON 50 thousand and RON 100 thousand, at the exchange rate 4.5 RONs for one euro as of November 2016. 
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months from the end date the announcement was published in the Registry. This condition 
implies that individuals without a permanent residence in Slovakia cannot buy land in the 
country.  
The validity of transactions is checked by district authorities where the land is located. 
The buyer is required to submit the documentation about the transaction and the local 
authority controls and issues a certificate confirming or rejecting the validity of the 
transaction within 30 days (60 days in exceptional situations) from the submission date. 
3.3. Poland 
Most recent changes in Poland were introduced in August 2015 (law no 1433/2015) – that is, 
just before the parliamentary elections in autumn 2015 - and in April 2016 (Law no 585/2016) 
– that is, just before the expiration of transitory restrictions introduced upon joining the EU. 
There are many similarities, especially the pre-emption right, with regulations implemented in 
Romania and Slovakia.  
In principle, new regulations specify that the agricultural land on parcels larger than 
0.3 hectares can be bought only by an individual farmer. The total agricultural area owned by 
the land buyer (together with land being bought) cannot exceed 300 hectares. These 
regulations do not include situations when land is transacted between relatives or when the 
local government, the state, the Agricultural Property Agency (APA) acting on behalf of the 
state, or the Church buy the land; or when the land transaction is the result of inheritance. 
Transactions with parties other than mentioned above (e.g., private companies) require the 
consent of the director of the APA. If the agricultural land was bought based on such consent, 
the buyer of land is obliged to run an agricultural farm which encompasses the transacted 
parcel(s) for the period of at least ten years (if a natural person bought it, (s)he should run the 
farm in person). During this time, the land parcel cannot be sold or transferred to other 
individuals.  
Whenever a plot of the agricultural land is going to be sold, the pre-emption right is 
with the tenant if the tenancy contract was written and was in place for at least three years and 
if the farmland parcel for sale belongs to the tenant’s family farm.14 Afterward, the pre-
emption right is with the APA. Those with a pre-emption right are notified of the offer by the 
notary who acts on behalf of the land seller. If not specified otherwise, the pre-emption right 
is valid for one month.  
                                                          
14
 A family farm is defined as (i) a farm managed by an individual farmer and (ii) a farm whose total agricultural 
area is smaller than 300 hectares.  
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There are many exemptions to the pre-emption right. For example, it does not apply if 
the farmland parcel is bought by seller’s relatives, if the land is purchased by the local 
government, or by the State Treasury. Similarly, the pre-emption right does not apply if the 
farmland parcel is bought by an individual farmer who would like to increase his farm within 
the limit up to 300 hectares and the land on offer is in the same or a neighboring municipality 
in which the land buyer lives.  
Further, the new law specifies that, if the price of a land parcel grossly diverges from 
its market value, those with pre-emption right may ask the local court, within 14 days, to 
establish its price. The new regulation also introduces the rule that rental contracts have to be 
written. Moreover, rental contracts for more than five years have to be concluded in the form 
of a notarial deed.  
As regards land transactions administered by the state’s Agency (APA), the new land 
market regulation specifies that the state-owned land can only be rented and not sold for the 
next five years. This rule does not include parcels of the agricultural land smaller than two 
hectares, land within the special economic zones or land which has been intended for non-
agricultural uses. Other exceptions need to be approved by the Ministry of Agriculture and 
Rural Development. Further, the new regulation specifies that the APA should manage its 
land first of all with the aim to increase family farms.  
Notwithstanding the moratorium on land sales of the state-owned land, the new 
regulations provide details on how the process of land sales should be organized. Information 
about land transactions offered by the APA should be available to everybody in a place where 
the parcel is located, in a local agricultural chamber, and in a local municipality council for 14 
days before putting the agricultural land out to tender. If the price of the agricultural land for 
sale is higher than the equivalent of 10 thousand quintiles of rye, the information about the 
offer has to be announced in newspapers with at least voivodship scope. Importantly, sales by 
the APA may take place if the total agricultural area owned by the land buyer (together with a 
parcel being bought) would not be larger than 300 hectares and the total area bought from the 
APA by a given buyer at any time would not be greater than 300 hectares.  
Priority to purchase land offered by the APA has/have (i) an agricultural cooperative 
which effectively holds the dominion of the land; (ii) tenants if the land tenancy lasts for at 
least three years; and (iii) those in charge of special economic zones. In addition, the APA 
may reserve that participation in tenders be limited to a particular group of people (e.g., 
individual farmers wishing to increase their family farm if they live in the municipality where 
the land is offered or in a neighboring municipality, former employees of state-owned farms, 
11 
 
or members of agricultural cooperatives which are put into liquidation). If the agricultural 
land was bought in such a closed tender, then the winner cannot sell the land for fifteen 
years
15
 and is obliged (if a natural person) to manage this land in person. 
3.4. Latvia 
In expectation of the termination of the previous restrictions on foreigners’ purchase of the 
agricultural land, Latvia adopted amendments to its law regulating agricultural land market – 
“Land Privatisation in Rural Areas” – on August 1, 2014, which changed the conditions of 
acquisition of the agricultural land (Latvijas Republikas Likums 2014). Under the new 
regulation, an individual (natural person) is entitled to acquire the agricultural land if (s)he 
conforms to following criteria: 
1) Performs an economic activity in Latvia and has registered it with the Latvian State 
Revenue Service (VID);  
2) Has received direct payments under the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) for at 
least a period of one year during last three years;
16
 or at least one third of his income from the 
economic activity during last three years has been derived from the agricultural production 
(this criterion entered into force on July 1, 2015); or has acquired agricultural education;  
3) Has confirmed in writing that (s)he will commence agricultural activities on the 
acquired land (either within a year, if the agricultural land benefited from single area 
payments under the CAP for the previous or the current year; or within three years if the 
application for single area payments has not been filed);  
4) On the day of filing the request for acquisition of land has no tax debt (either in 
Latvia or the state of the permanent residence). 
A company can acquire the agricultural land if it conforms to criteria 1, 3, and 4 as 
well as the following criteria: 
1) Has received single area payments under the CAP for at least one year during last 
three years
17
 or at least one-third of the company’s income during last three years has been 
derived from the agricultural production;  
2) At least: (a) one of its owners or a permanent employee has professional education 
in agriculture or (b) one-third of the total income of at least one of the owners during previous 
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 This does not apply to transfers within close relatives. Further, it can be dispelled with a written consent issued 
by the APA.  
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 The regulation requires that the land buyer has received single area payments under the EU Regulation 
No.73/2009 for at least one year during the last three-year period; or has received direct payments under the EU 
Regulation No. 1307/2013 as of 1 July 2015. 
17
 Similar to individuals (natural persons), under the EU Regulation No.73/2009 for at least a year during the last 
three-year period; or under the EU Regulation No. 1307/2013 as of July 1, 2015. 
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three years is derived from agricultural activities;  
3) Can confirm that all its beneficial owners are citizens of either Latvia, the EU, the 
European Economic Area, or the Swiss Confederation;  
According to these amendments, an individual or company cannot acquire more than 
2 thousand hectares of the agricultural land in total. It should also be noted that according to 
the new legislation, the local municipality (novada dome) can set a maximum amount of the 
agricultural land to be acquired by an individual or a company which is less than the 
maximum amount stipulated by the national law. 
To acquire the agricultural land, an application form together with documents 
evidencing: (1) the land transaction (a deed or agreement); and (2) the compliance with the 
above criteria, needs to be filed in with the local municipality. 
The new regulations also identify pre-emption rights on farmland. They include co-
owners, the last tenant of the agricultural land that can prove that (s)he has previously applied 
for single area payments for the land parcel put on sale. After co-owners and tenants, pre-
emption rights are given to the Latvian Land Fund (Latvijas Zemes Fonds),
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 which was 
established on July 1, 2015 to foster the use of land in the agricultural production by buying 
unused land parcels from landlords and selling or leasing them out to those who wish to use 
them for farming. Having pre-emption rights, the Latvian Land Fund can buy any 
unencumbered farmland for a price that does not exceed the average market price of farmland 
in the given region and county. 
Since July 2015, when the Latvian Land Fund signed first agreements on farmland 
purchases, the Latvian Land Fund has bought a total around 200 land parcels covering more 
than 3000 hectares for almost 10 million EUR.
19
 Further, the Land Fund not only buys 
farmland but also leases it out to farmers. By June 2017, lease agreements for more than two 
thousand hectares of land have been signed. Although the Land Fund owns less than 1 percent 
of the total agricultural area in Latvia, it has to be recognized that the Fund has been in 
existence for a short period, and its farmland ownership is increasing relatively rapidly. In 
addition, currently, it is acquiring land in all regions, including regions with the most 
productive farmland (e.g., Zemgale). 
In economic terms, pre-emption rights (after co-owners and current tenants) given to 
the Latvian Land Fund, imply that the Latvian State can indirectly control which land is being 
sold on the market by taking into consideration potential buyers.  







Finally, in May 2017 Latvia adopted a new law further restricting land acquisitions by 
foreigners.
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 In particular, the knowledge of the Latvian language is required for all buyers of 
farmland in Latvia, and pre-emption rights are further strengthened in favor of current tenants 
and the Latvian Land Fund. These changes imply that the acquisition of the agricultural land 
by foreigners will become very difficult as from July 2017 when the new law enters in force. 
Overall, in all the analyzed countries, the new regulations have considerably changed 
the way in which land markets are organized. While the introduced regulations share many 
similarities, they also vary across the four countries, despite the fact that they were designed 
with the same intention. This observation is in line with numerous studies which show that 
only a minor variation in the underlying characteristics of the socio-economic environment 
(e.g., productivity or the cost of conflict) may lead to substantial differences in the 
components of the institutional system (e.g., North et al. 2009; Acemoglu and Robinson 2012; 
van Besouw et al. 2015). The earlier discussion indicates that Slovakia has the strictest 
regulations while Romania seems to be the most liberal. Below we attempt to account for 
these differences and identify what strategies the beneficiaries of the new regulations used to 
advance their interests. Political influence and characteristics of key actors lobbying for the 
new regulations, combined with the external environment and pressures (e.g., globalization), 
appear to have played a particularly prominent role. 
4. Explaining the new regulations 
As illustrated above, one important implication of the new regulations in all four countries is 
that access to land for some groups of potential investors has become much more challenging. 
Such restrictions on land transactions share several features of what the literature describes as 
particularized institutions (Ogilvie and Carus, 2014). These institutions, instead of applying 
uniformly to all economic agents, apply only to a subset of them. In our context, the new 
regulations protect the interest of current land users and create entry barriers to new potential 
investors, regardless of their intentions to invest in land.  
A particularly useful perspective to look at these issues is offered by political economy 
analyses of the functioning of land markets. A broad consensus that emerges from this 
literature is that the changes in land regulations and institutions in Europe were not 
necessarily efficiency-driven. Instead, they largely reflected the relative power balance 
between different land market groups interested in capturing the highest rents possible 
(Swinnen 1999, 2002; Swinnen et al. 2014b). This line of reasoning is consistent with the 





argument advanced in the original institutional economics literature which emphasizes that 
the composition of the institutional system is often an outcome of distributional conflicts 
(Commons 1924; Polanyi 1944). More recent studies drawing on the institutional political 
economy approach (e.g., Bromley 2008; Obeng-Odoom 2016) provide further support for this 
view and convincingly argue that transitions from one institutional system to the other are 
often aligned with the interests of those having political influences and thus may not lead to 
overall efficiency improvements. This might be especially the case if one considers efficiency 
not only from an economic, but also from the social and ecological point of view (Obeng-
Odoom 2016).  
In the context of the functioning of agricultural land markets, there are different 
competing interest groups (e.g., domestic versus foreign buyers; tenants versus landowners; 
farmers’ unions versus rest of society). The outcome of the conflict between these groups 
depends on the resources that they can mobilize to advance their goals. This in turn largely 
depends on how easy they can solve collective action problems (Olson 1965).  
4.1. Accounting for the differences among the analyzed countries 
The interest-group theory seems to be particularly useful to highlight the mechanism behind 
introducing the new regulations in Slovakia. The Slovak agricultural sector is dominated by 
large corporate farms, which use more than 81% of the total agricultural land (Table 2).
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 The 
high concentration of land usage is important as it may easily translate into the strength of the 
pressure that farming interest groups, composed of relatively few large players, can exert on 
the state when seeking protection. The reason for this is that smaller groups find it easier to 
solve collective action problems. This results from the fact that members of such groups have 
typically more to win from a given policy since the benefits they face are much more 
concentrated (Olson 1965). The new regulations allow large corporate farms in Slovakia to 
enjoy the benefits of restricting land markets as follows. The corporate farms rent most of the 
land they operate on (around 90% according to EP 2014). Typically, landowners are small or 
absent, and live in urban areas or are employed outside of agriculture. This situation makes 
corporate farms vulnerable to an open competition on the land sales market (liberal land sales 
regulations) as they may lose access to land if the ownership structure changed (Ciaian and 
Swinnen 2006; Kancs and Ciaian 2010, 2012). The fragmented ownership structure in 
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 For comparison, in other countries under study, land use is much more fragmented and farming is mostly 
undertaken by small-scale family farms (EP 2014; Swinnen et al. 2014b). For example, in Poland and Latvia 
family farms use around 90% of agricultural land. In Romania, this share amounts to 56% (Table 2).  
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Slovakia favors incumbent corporate farms,
22
 as small landowners face high transaction costs 
of land sales market participation as well as they have a rather low bargaining power with 
respect to large corporate farms in negotiating the terms of their tenancy arrangements (Ciaian 
and Swinnen 2006). The liberalization of the land sales market may break-up the existing 
ownership structure and lead to a concentration of the land ownership, particularly if capital-
endowed foreign investors entered the land market. Such structural changes may reduce the 
bargaining power of incumbent corporate farms on the rental markets and lead to a loss of the 
land renting.  
The interest group theory seems to be unsatisfactory in explaining the situation in the 
three remaining countries. This is because in Poland and Latvia, and to a large extent also in 
Romania, the new regulations favor relatively small-scale farmers who constitute a great 
majority of farm operators.
23
 According to the interest group theory summarized above, these 
large groups of relatively small producers should face serious free-rider problems and 
therefore be less efficient in lobbying for protection.
24
  
To explain the introduction of the new land regulations in Romania, Poland, and 
Latvia, we identify two main mechanisms. Both of them relate to the influence that the 
beneficiaries of the new regulations exert on the decision makers through the political system. 
The first mechanism relies on farmers’ political power which stems from their group size. In 
all three countries, farmers constitute an important part of the electorate, especially in rural 
areas. To illustrate this, the employment share of agriculture, forestry, and fisheries in rural 
regions amounted to 39% in Romania, 27% in Poland and 15% in Latvia in 2009 (Eurostat 
2009). In addition, in many predominantly rural regions of these countries, this share was 
higher than that observed for industry, construction, or even services.
25
 One may, therefore, 
assume that demands of this particular constituency had to be taken into account in various 
policy platforms (Swinnen and Vranken 2007; Macours and Swinnen 2002). Consequently, 
the political decision to introduce the new regulations that would make access to land for 
small-scale producers easier could be seen as an attempt to win their electoral support. The 
fact that in all three countries the introduction of the new land regulations was followed by 
national elections (either presidential - Romania, Poland, or parliamentary - Latvia, Poland) 
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 The agricultural land ownership is split into 9.6 million plots in Slovakia with an average plot size of 0.45 
hectares owned by between 12 and 15 owners (Bandlerova, Marisova and Schwarcz 2011). 
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 Compared to Slovakia, in the three remaining countries the share of land rented is also much lower and varies 
from 17% in Romania, 20% in Poland, to 27% in Latvia (Swinnen et al. 2014b).  
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 March 2017) 
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supports this argument.  
The second mechanism to explain the new land regulations in Latvia, Poland, and 
Romania draws on the fact that farmers’ demands to introduce restrictions on foreign land 
ownership received large support from the general public. For example, according to the 
opinion poll conducted on a representative sample in Poland in October 2016 (i.e., already 
after the new regulations have been introduced), 76% of respondents strongly agreed or rather 
agreed that Polish land should not be sold to foreigners (CBOS 2016). In all three countries 
land acquisition by foreigners was often presented and perceived by the public as a threat to 
the national food security or the livelihoods of local communities. While we are not aware of 
any study that would investigate the importance of land issues in voters’ preferences, the 
support that a general public in the analyzed countries gave to the new regulations is very 
much in line with the literature documenting that voters often engage in “sociotropic” voting 
(Duch and Stevenson 2008). According to this view, voters’ decisions are driven by their 
perception of the situation at a macro or local level rather than at the individual or household 
level (Ansolabehere et al. 2014). Consistent with this reasoning, there is now an extensive 
literature showing that exposure to risk deriving from global competition shapes support for 
protection and that this effect is not restricted to a specific category of voters (Mayda and 
Rodrik, 2005; Margalit, 2012; Colantone and Stanig, 2016). In our context, this could be used 
to explain why people may support restrictions on foreign land acquisition even though they 
are not directly affected by it. As before, these determinants of voters’ behavior must have 
been taken into account by politicians who sought to be (re)elected and might have paved the 
way for adopting the new land regulations.  
While the two mechanisms could have played their role in Latvia, Poland, and 
Romania, the three countries differed in terms of resources that farmers mobilized to advance 
their interests. Interestingly, in Latvia and Romania there were hardly any protests against 
foreign land ownership. In Poland instead, the situation looked very different, and nationwide 
farmers’ protests were continuously launched. These protests took various forms which 
included hundreds of road blockades at different points across the country, manifestations 
gathering thousands of people in the capital or the occupation camp outside the prime 
minister’s office lasting for four consecutive months. Importantly, the protests were organized 
not only close to the date in which the old transitory measures were supposed to cease to exist 
but were launched continuously over a couple of years. Thanks to this they had a higher 
chance of breaking through to the general public and win its support.  
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In Latvia and Romania, the main pressure on the government to introduce the new 
regulations was coming from farmers’ unions but not through the street protests. In Latvia, the 
main pressure to tighten the legislation concerning the farmland acquisition by foreigners was 
coming mainly from coalition partners in the Latvian government. Since 2014, the Union of 
Greens & Farmers and the National Alliance (together with Unity) are main governing parties 
in Latvia. The Union of Greens and Farmers, which holds both President and Prime Minister 
positions, strongly supports Latvian farmers – for obvious reasons. The second largest 
governing party – the National Alliance – is concerned among others about the property 
acquisition by foreigners. As a result, between 2014 and 2017 a number of farmland sales 
restrictions have been anchored in the Latvian legislation. In Romania, in turn, the issue of 
land distribution additionally played a role. Small individual farms and large corporate farms 
coexist in Romania. The political power distribution and conflicting interests between small 
individual farms and large corporate farms may have prevented the introduction of more 
stringent rules and thus may explain the adoption of a more liberal regulatory framework. 
4.2. New land market regulations in the EU context 
The implementation of the new regulations in all the analyzed NMS has also been greatly 
facilitated by the similarity of land markets restrictions used by some OMS. While there is a 
great diversity of land market regulations in the EU, some of the OMS support very 
particularized institutions which are strongly biased in favor of local agricultural producers 




As often acknowledged by officials from the four NMS under study, the changes in 
the governance of land markets in their countries often followed the example of the 
regulations in OMS. The most popular measure among OMS is the pre-emption rights granted 
to various market agents (e.g., tenants, neighboring farmers, co-owners). This type of measure 
is also the key change introduced by the new regulations in all four analyzed countries.  
Compared to other EU countries – with the new regulations in place – Romania will 
remain the most liberal land market in the EU. Other EU countries implement either 
approximately equal or stricter rules targeting land sales markets, rental markets, or both. On 
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 According to Swinnen et al. (2014a), one of the strongest land market interventions can be found in France. At 
the other end of the spectrum are countries with least regulated land markets, including Sweden, Germany, 
Finland, the UK, Greece, and Ireland. These countries have minimal interventions in both sales and rental 
markets. Finally, several countries, such as Belgium, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Slovenia, implement a 
moderate level of regulations in land markets. These countries usually regulate one side of the market: either the 
sales or the rental market. For example, in Belgium, where about 70 percent of the agricultural land is rented, 
most regulations are in the rental market. 
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the other hand, the new regulation will make Slovakia one of the most protected land markets 
similar to France, where regional organizations (SAFERs) effectively control local land 
markets through their power to buy, sell, and rent out the agricultural land. They ensure that 
only working farmers own the land. The SAFERs can also affect the level of the farm 
restructuring and growth by requiring farmers to get authorization from them for the farm 
expansion (Latruffe et al., 2013). Similar measures to Slovakia are also in Austria where new 
owners of the agricultural land are required to have their residence relatively close to the land 
plot and have a proof of competence in the agricultural sector (through experience or 
education). In Hungary, there is a legal obligation for a new owner to ensure that the 
agricultural land is cultivated.  
Poland and Latvia have moderately high land sales regulations, particularly if 
combined with pre-existing regulations. In Latvia, the new regulation requires a proof of 
competence in the agricultural sector (through experience or education), the knowledge of the 
Latvian language and buyers need to perform the agricultural production on the acquired land, 
while this is regulated by the pre-existing regulations in Poland. Additionally, the Latvian 
Land Fund may affect land markets through an active purchase and sale or rent of the 
agricultural land. In Poland, a special privilege is granted to pre-emption right holders under 
the new regulation who can challenge the selling price asked by the seller in the court, if 
perceived too high, as well as transactions need to be approved by the Agricultural Property 
Agency. 
5. Conceptual analysis and expected outcomes of the new land market regulations 
By creating limited access to land, the new regulations affect the distribution of rents linked to 
the land ownership and land usage. On the one hand, this concerns social privileges such as 
status and place in social hierarchy at the local level. By limiting the land access, the current 
regulations may make the land inheritance an important determinant of the relative success at 
the farm level (compare with Loughrey et al., 2016). On the other hand, the new organization 
of land markets has a direct impact on the distribution of benefits related to various subsidies 
provided to farmers under the CAP. This is because these subsidies are to a large extent land 
based. 
The existing evidence on the functioning of similar regulations in OMS is very scarce. 
Piet et al. (2012) show, for example, that in France, a country with a heavy state intervention 
in land markets, restrictions on land transactions contributed to a reduced land inequality. 
Further, as reported above, land prices in France are among the lowest in the OMS and, in 
fact, close to those observed in NMS. Latruffe et al. (2013) find that the intervention of public 
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authority (i.e., SAFER) in agricultural land markets reduces land sales prices in Brittany 
(France). 
While this evidence is interesting, there may be other potential consequences that 
restrictions on the access to land may bring about. In the following sections, we focus on 
transaction costs that the new regulations create to market participants and alter the overall 
land market transparency. We follow with the analysis of their potential market impacts with 
a more detailed focus on land price effects, distortions of land sales transactions, and on 
domestic farmers’ and foreigners’ access to land. 
5.1. Transaction costs 
The new land market regulations make land sales transactions more costly in terms of 
bureaucracy and time. In all four studied countries, indirectly, they also introduce restrictions 
to the foreign land acquisition. In sum, they generate additional direct and indirect transaction 
costs for land sales transfers not only to foreign but also domestic buyers and sellers.  
The transaction costs include various direct costs (fees and various payments such as 
notary charges) incurred by the seller. In all four studied countries, sellers are required to 
announce the offer in a designated public place/directly inform those with a pre-emption right. 
Further, the sales contract must be accompanied by various additional documents, which 
usually imply extra costs.  
Indirect costs to the land seller and buyer take the form of the opportunity costs of the 
time spent on arranging the whole procedure. These costs are specific to the land seller and 
buyer and depend on their characteristics (e.g., whether buyers have pre-emption rights or the 
size of the land market transaction). The land seller needs to spend the time to prepare the 
required documentation and to communicate with official authorities. Also, buyers are 
affected because they need, for example, to provide documents proving their status or they 
need to express their intent in writing to buy in the case of pre-emption right holders.  
Further, potential buyers bear the cost associated with the uncertainty of completing 
the purchase transaction, because there are different types of potential buyers with a different 
priority (access right) and different waiting periods (up to 30 days in Romania and Poland and 
up to six months in Slovakia). The transaction uncertainty is the highest for individuals or 
companies without the pre-emption right because they need to wait the longest. The waiting 
time also implies opportunity costs of time to both sellers and buyers.  
Note that the new land market regulations may induce transaction costs also for those 
individuals and companies that have pre-emption rights or are exempted from procedures 
established by the new regulations. This possibility arises because they need to provide 
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documentation proving that they belong to the exempted group. However, the transaction with 
this group of buyers tends to be associated with the lowest transaction costs, because this 
procedure is less demanding when selling land and buyers face a higher certainty of 
completing the purchase transaction.  
The actual size of transaction costs will ultimately also be determined by the 
efficiency of public institutions in charge of the implementation of the new regulations. Public 
authorities need to put in place administrative structures that will implement and enforce the 
new land market regulations. This requirement holds for all local, regional, and central 
authorities. However, most burdens are imposed on local authorities, as they execute the new 
administrative procedures and directly communicate with the sellers and buyers. If the 
resources of public authorities are not supplemented, procedures may be prolonged and thus 
further increase transaction costs for land buyers and sellers. 
5.2. Market transparency  
While the new regulations can be associated with the increased transaction costs (direct or 
indirect) it should be noted that they may reduce the problem of the imperfect information and 
increase the market transparency. In general, information about sales offers of the agricultural 
land is costly and often hardly accessible to external buyers. The evidence on rural land 
markets tends to suggest that residents have easier access to information, because they are 
integrated into the local economic and social environment and have a better knowledge about 
potential sales offers or the land quality. As a result, agricultural land sales transactions tend 
to be localized at the village level (Deininger and Feder 2001; Johnson et al. 2008; Janssen et 
al. 2014).  
The requirement to publicly announce sales offers is one of the key elements of the 
new regulations which may contribute to higher market transparency. The public availability 
of information increases access to land offers to all buyers. In particular, external buyers may 
benefit disproportionally more from greater access to information of sales transaction than 
local ones, as they face higher search and information costs. If more potential buyers obtain 
information about sales offers, it may lead to a higher competition on the land market.  
5.3. Market impacts of the new regulations  
Three channels can be distinguished by which the new regulations may impact land markets: 
(i) seller’s transaction costs, (ii) buyer’s transaction costs, and (iii) sales market transparency 
(e.g., lower search costs). The first channel is materialized through the cost of selling land. 
The second channel reduces access to the land market to buyers without pre-emption rights. 
The transparency effect, in turn, reduces the information asymmetry among market 
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participants and thus may imply a higher competition in land markets. In the following 
sections, we analyze the potential impacts of these channels on land prices, distortions on land 
sales transactions, and domestic farmers’ and foreigners’ access to land. We evaluate the 
impact of these variables in comparison to a counterfactual situation without the new 
regulations in place. Finally, following this analysis we draw some implications of the new 
regulations for local communities in rural areas. 
5.3.1. The impact of seller’s transaction costs 
As explained above, transaction costs on the seller’s side make land sales more expensive. 
Since sellers need to incur additional costs (e.g., administrative costs, opportunity costs of 
time), they will tend to ask higher prices to offset the increased costs or will restrict the land 
supply quantity if costs are perceived as too high. The expected impact of both effects is a 
higher pressure on the land demand, likely leading to higher land prices. However, the 
magnitude of the price effect depends on the size of the sellers’ transaction costs which may 
vary from country to country as well as between regions within a country, depending on the 
ability of public authorities to put an effective implementation of the new regulations in place 
(Table 4).  
Further, seller’s transaction costs cause distortions in land markets through reducing 
the number of land market exchanges relative to a situation without the new regulations 
(Table 4). More costly land transactions will deter buyers from land acquisitions because of 
higher prices or will reduce sellers’ participation in the land market due to heavier 
bureaucratic hurdles. The land market will diminish its function in facilitating the land 
reallocation toward higher productivity. Thinner and more expensive land sales transactions 
will likely inhibit the transfer of land from less to more productive land users. Instead, seller’s 
transaction costs may support the land renting as landowners may prefer disposing land on the 
rental market if the costs associated with land sales become more expensive and 
administratively more costly. 
The increase in sellers’ transaction costs induced by the new regulations will impact 
farmers’ and foreigners’ access to land if transaction costs depend on the type of buyer, that 
is, if selling land to farmers or foreigners imply different transaction costs to sellers than if 
selling it to non-farmers or domestic buyers, respectively. The administrative procedure is 
more demanding from the seller’s point of view only in Slovakia if the land buyer is not a 
farmer. Non-farmers have to wait for at least six months to be able to bid for land which 
increases the seller’s opportunity costs of time and the uncertainty of completing the 
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transaction. Hence, selling land to farmers (those registered in Slovakia) implies lower 
transaction costs to sellers, implying that farmers have better access to the land sales market. 
In Romania, Poland, and Latvia the seller’s transaction costs to a large extent do not 
depend on whether the buyer is a farmer or non-farmer or whether it is foreign or domestic. 
All types of buyers appear to induce same transaction costs to sellers. As a result, the new 
regulations do not alter farmers and foreigners access to land if the impact of sellers’ 
transaction costs is taken into account. In these three countries, sellers may face only some 
uncertainty of completing transactions when selling land to non-farmers (domestic or foreign) 
because pre-emption right holders may exercise their right, implying that transaction cannot 
be certain even if pre-agreed before all legal procedures are completed. For this reason, sellers 
may prefer buyers with pre-emption right if the sales price is equal. Hence, the new 
regulations may cause a small impact of seller’s transaction costs on improving land access to 
farmers and decreasing the land access to non-farmers (domestic or foreign) (Table 4). 
5.3.2. The impact of buyer’s transaction costs 
The new regulations imply higher and more heterogeneous buyer’s transaction costs between 
different types of buyers. First, transaction costs on the buyers’ side lead to more expensive 
land acquisitions because buyers need to incur additional costs (e.g., administrative costs, 
opportunity costs of time) when bidding for land sales offers. Second, the new regulations 
generate asymmetric transaction costs between different types of buyers (i.e., between those 
with pre-emption rights and those without). Land purchase costs are higher to buyers without 
than with pre-emption rights. The land market participation of buyers without pre-emption 
rights may decrease, leading to a lower competition in land markets. Both effects will tend to 
exercise a downward pressure on land prices (Table 4). This result is the reverse of the impact 
discussed above for the sellers’ transaction costs.27  
Similar to sellers’ transaction costs, also buyers’ transaction costs lead to sales market 
transaction distortions compared to a situation without the new regulations. More costly land 
transactions will deter buyers from a land market participation. In particular, the market 
participation of buyers without pre-emption rights may be reduced because of heavier 
bureaucratic hurdles imposed on them. Moreover, some buyers are completely excluded (e.g., 
buyers without a permanent residence in Slovakia) from the market participation. These 
factors will likely reduce the dynamics and the number of land market transactions. More 
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 This is a standard result of policy impact analysis: suppliers’ taxes lead to a decrease in supply, thereby 
increasing prices; while demand taxes decrease the demand, thereby decreasing prices, but increase overall costs. 
These results do not hold in an open economy model since prices may be determined on the international 
markets. However, this matters less for our study since farm land is not traded in international markets. 
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productive buyers willing to invest in agriculture may be deterred from the land market 
participation. Overall, the ability of the market to facilitate the relocation of land from less to 
more productive land users diminishes (Table 4).  
Further, the new regulations will improve access to land to farmers and reduce the 
access to foreigners (Table 4). Farmers are preferred to non-farmers in the form of having pre-
emption rights. Overall, this implies that the new regulations tend to improve the farmers’ 
access to the land ownership. This is more important in Slovakia followed by Latvia, and 
Poland, while the impact is expected to be minor in Romania. In Slovakia, buyers need to 
have competence (experience) in the agricultural sector to have pre-emption rights. In 
contrast, non-farming buyers need to wait for a minimum of six months to be eligible for a 
land acquisition which increases their opportunity costs of time and the uncertainty of 
completing the land sales transaction. Similarly, in Poland and Latvia the competence in the 
agricultural sector (through experience or education) is also required to have access to pre-
emption rights. Further, in Latvia buyers need to perform agricultural production on the 
acquired land and have knowledge of the Latvian language, while in Poland buyers with pre-
emption rights can challenge the land price in court if perceived too high as well as 
transactions need to be approved by the Agricultural Property Agency if the buyer is not an 
individual farmer. In contrast to Slovakia, there is no waiting period in Poland and Latvia for 
non-farming landowners. The farmers’ access to land may also improve in Romania but not as 
much as in Slovakia, Poland, or Latvia. The protection of farmers through having pre-emption 
rights is significantly lower in Romania as there are no additional requirements such as 
competence. Non-farmers without pre-emption rights may face only the uncertainty of the 
transaction completion and some opportunity costs of time. 
Regarding foreign buyers, they are almost completely excluded from accessing land in 
Slovakia because any land buyer is required to have a permanent residence in Slovakia for at 
least ten years. In Latvia and Poland, the negative impact on foreigners’ access to land is 
smaller than is Slovakia. In these two countries, the access is not completely restricted; only 
certain additional requirements are imposed on foreigners (e.g., EU individuals not being an 
individual farmer in Poland need to get special permission, in Latvia individuals and 
companies need to have knowledge of the Latvian language and cannot buy land if not 
registered within the State Revenue Service). In Romania foreigners’ access to land is not 
affected by the new regulation compared to domestic buyers; the new requirements are 
imposed equally on all type of buyers irrespective if they are domestic or foreign (Table 4). 
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5.3.3. The impact of  greater transparency 
The expected impact of an increased transparency is an increase in the competition in the land 
market coming from less-informed buyers, which is projected to exercise an upward pressure 
on land prices. Greater information availability about land offers reduces buyers’ search costs 
and increases the land demand. These changes may be accompanied by an increase in the 
number of land sales transactions thus having the opposite effect compared to sellers’ and 
buyers’ transactions costs (Table 4).  
The main beneficiaries of improved transparency are expected to be mainly external 
buyers, including foreign ones. External buyers may benefit because usually they have more 
costly access to the local land market information compared to local buyers. However, the 
overall impact will depend on overall market imperfections, that is, in the size of the actual 
information asymmetry between external buyers and local buyers. Note that also local buyers 
may benefit from greater transparency if the information problem exists at the local level; for 
example, if markets are not well developed (e.g., non-existence of real estate agencies).   
The largest impact of improved market transparency is expected in Romania followed 
by Latvia, whereas in Poland and Slovakia the impact will likely be small. Contrary to the 
initial intent, the new regulation may facilitate foreigners’ access to land in Romania because 
it improves the transparency of land transactions. This effect will materialize if there are 
uninformed foreigners willing to offer a higher price than domestic buyers. All land sales 
offers are announced on a public web page in Romania. Although the primary aim is to 
inform the pre-emption right holders about the land offer, it also provides information for the 
rest of potential buyers. As explained above, the impact is particularly relevant in the presence 
of imperfect information in the land market when local sales offers are not known to external 
buyers (to those outside the village).  
A similar effect is expected in Latvia because all offers are required to be published. 
However, because buyers’ competence in agriculture is necessary, likely the transparency 
effect will minimally improve access to land to external non-farm buyers; only external farm 
buyers may benefit.  
In Slovakia, the transparency effect will be minimal, given that foreigners without 
permanent residence are effectively excluded from land sales markets. Only foreigners 
fulfilling this requirement may benefit from a greater transparency, which may increase their 
access to land. Further, as described above, sales offers done with buyers of group one are not 
required to be announced in the designated public place. It is likely that also in Poland the 
transparency effect will be close to zero because private transactions are not required to be 
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published; this concerns only sales of public land. 
5.3.4. Overall impacts 
Table 4 provides a summary of the expected effects of the new regulations compared to a 
situation without regulations. In Slovakia, Poland, and Latvia land prices are expected to 
decline, while in Romania the prices are expected to increase slightly. The same holds for the 
foreigners’ access to land, whereas the farmers’ access to land is expected to increase in all 
four countries, though less so in Romania than in other countries. Finally, land market 
transactions are expected to decrease in Slovakia, Poland, and Latvia and may slightly 
increase in Romania due to the new regulations. 
As indicated above, the effects in Slovakia are driven by lower competition due to 
limited access to land for certain types of buyers. The non-farmers access to land is heavily 
restricted which reduces the competition on the land market. This effect will likely dominate 
the other two effects. In particular, the gain from greater transparency will be low, given that 
the potential beneficiaries of this effect (external buyers) are restricted in accessing the land 
sales market, while foreigners are almost entirely excluded. Overall, it is likely that the new 
regulation will achieve its intended policy objective to reduce foreign buyers’ access to land 
in Slovakia. However, the collateral effect is greater distortions in land markets and land 
value loss. The new regulation devaluates the value of land, thus generating losses to 
landowners, of whom many are farmers or reside in rural areas. 
Also in Poland and Latvia, potential land market effects are driven by a lower 
competition due to hindered access to land for non-farming buyers. This effect is expected to 
dominate the other two effects. In contrast to Slovakia, foreigners are not entirely excluded 
from the land market; their access is only hampered. Hence, some impacts of greater 
competition from a higher transparency might be materialized. Overall, the new regulations 
likely will partially achieve their objective to reduce the land acquisition by foreigners in 
Poland and Latvia. Land market distortions are expected to materialize in reduced land 
transactions and lower prices.  
In Romania, the transparency effect will likely dominate the other two effects. The 
competition effect is minimal, as access to particular types of buyers (those without pre-
emption rights) is reduced, though not as much as in Slovakia, while none of the buyers are 
excluded from the land market. Also, the transparency effect will likely offset the seller’s 
transaction costs effect. Thus, contrary to initial objectives, the new regulations may improve 
foreign buyers’ access to land to the detriment of local farmers. The new regulation collects 
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and supplies free of charge information on sales offers to market participants, the greatest 
beneficiaries of which are likely external buyers (including foreign ones). 
5.3.5. Impact on local communities  
The introduction of the new regulations increases the costs of organizing land transactions in 
all four countries under study. The relationship between the changes in the functioning of land 
markets and overall costs, however, is far from being obvious when analyzing the impact on 
local communities. In line with the literature on agrarian change, rural sociology or 
institutional political economy, it can be argued that the new regulations can help to avoid 
incurring considerable costs in the future (e.g., van der Ploeg 2008; 2013; Borras and Franco 
2012; Obeng-Odoom, 2013).
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 This is because the new regulations are expected to slow down 
several processes that are likely to interfere with the existing land-based social relations and 
which may, therefore, have negative impacts on the sustainability of rural livelihoods. These 
processes include excessive land concentration, land grabbing or a strong preference towards 
commercialization of the way in which resources are governed. These phenomena are often 
associated with small-scale farmers and rural poor (often older or less educated farmers) being 
dispossessed and/or displaced. In this context, the new regulations may potentially contribute 
to lowering the costs related to accommodating these people in new places and/or jobs as well 
as preserving the culture and traditions which are part of local communities. As such, the new 
regulations may relieve, at least to some extent, the budgets of regional or cohesion policies 
which otherwise would have to cope with potentially detrimental impacts of keeping the land 
regulations too liberal.  
As the above analysis suggests, the impact of the new regulations on local 
communities is expected to be heterogeneous across the four countries under study. The 
highest effect of new regulations is likely to be in Poland and Latvia, followed by Slovakia. In 
these three countries, the new regulations improve farmers’ access to land relative to non-
farmers and foreign buyers (Table 4) which may support local farmers and thus limit the 
disruption of existing land-based social relations. Although in Slovakia the new regulations 
introduce a relatively strong protection for local farmers, the fact that the majority of land is 
controlled by large companies (through rental markets) (Table 2) implies that the gains for 
local communities (or small farmers) may be limited. Whether land is controlled by the 
incumbent large farms or new (foreign) buyers will likely not significantly alter the fabric of 
rural areas. Recall also that, in line with the interest group theory, the new regulation was 
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adopted in Slovakia with the aim to protect the current farm structure (i.e., the incumbent 
large farm’s access to land); it never attempted to be addressed towards supporting and 
protecting small farmers or local communities. In Poland and Latvia, the gains for local 
communities could be present given that the farming structure in these two countries is 
dominated by small farms (Table 2). However, the impacts are likely to be very location 
specific depending on farm structure and social relations present in a particular region.  
In Romania, the impact of the new regulation is expected to be minimal or rather 
negative on local communities because it actually may improve foreign buyers’ (and non-
farmers) access to land to the detriment of local farmers. The entry of external players may 
have some adverse implications for social relations in rural areas and may displace older or 
less educated farmers. However, the impact of improved foreigners’ access to land might not 
necessarily affect adversely rural development in Romania. In fact, the displaced farmers may 
benefit from greater job availability in rural areas due to an increase in foreign investments. In 
fact, a part of land grabbing literature argues that foreign land acquisitions could be 
instrumental in promoting growth and development in rural areas. A multitude of direct and 
indirect positive effects can arise from foreign investments such as re-cultivation of 
abandoned land, job growth, adding value to underutilized land, improvement of working 
conditions of agricultural labor, adoption of new technology and innovations, improved 
market access for farmers, and increase in agricultural export potential (Görgen et al. 2009; 
Swinnen and Vranken 2009, 2010). 
6. Conclusions 
This report describes the new land regulations introduced in Romania, Slovakia, Poland, and 
Latvia as a response to the expiration of the transitory restrictions imposed after the EU 
accession on agricultural land acquisitions by foreigners. With the desire to preserve the status 
quo, the new regulations provide limited access to land ownership directly to some groups of 
domestic buyers and indirectly also to foreign ones. The objective of this report was to 
investigate their potential implications for land markets, land prices, transaction distortions 
and access to land to domestic farmers’ and foreign buyers. As we show, the overall impact of 
the new regulations is not obvious, and both their pros and cons could be mentioned. In 
addition, the effects of the new organization of land markets will likely differ across the 
analyzed countries.  
The main element of the new regulations common across all four studied countries is 
the introduction of the pre-emption rights to certain groups of potential buyers. However, 
what differs among the four studied countries is the coverage of pre-emption rights which 
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give differentiated protection to domestic farmers vis–à–vis non-agricultural or foreign 
investors. In line with the interest group theory, this can be explained by the observed 
differences in the relative power of interest groups competing for land resources and the 
particularities of the external pressures (e.g., globalization). By far, the regulations adopted in 
Slovakia are the most restrictive, followed by Latvia and Poland; while Romania has adopted 
the least restrictive measures. 
The preferential treatment given to local farms in the new regulations (particularly in 
Latvia, Poland, and Slovakia) seems to address, at least in part, several concerns raised in the 
“land grabbing” literature, according to which the farmland grabbing is weakening the socio-
economic and environmental vitality of rural economies. In combination with an increasing 
concentration of land ownership and decreasing numbers of small farms in NMS, land 
grabbing is endangering the sustainability and multifunctionality of rural economies, which 
may have negative implications for the food security, social cohesion, employment, and the 
environment in the EU. 
In light of potential negative consequences identified in the land grabbing literature, 
there may be a case for a policy intervention. In order to avoid the negative effects of land 
grabbing on the local fabric of rural areas in NMS, there is some scope for the land market 
regulation, for example, by restricting non-farming investors’ access to land acquisitions and 
giving a certain power to state agencies (as done in Latvia and Poland) to intervene in 
agricultural land markets in favor of local farmers. Regulating the process of the 
‘commercialization of commons’ would be in line also with institutional political economy 
arguments. However, this needs a careful analysis, and it is highly specific to the overall 
context. For example, although Slovakia introduced a relatively strong protection for local 
farmers, gains for small farmers (or local communities) are expected to be small, because the 
majority of land is controlled by large companies, and the new regulation is perceived to 
protect their status quo situation rather than aiming to improve land access to small farmers or 
to protect local communities. Moreover, there is now a considerable research arguing that 
foreign land acquisitions could be instrumental in promoting growth and development of rural 
areas. Foreign land acquisitions may stimulate foreign investments in the rural area and lead 
to a variety of positive effects spanning from the re-cultivation of an abandoned land to the 
improvement of working conditions of agricultural workers. Hence, policy interventions may 
not be desirable on this ground, suggesting that the new regulations (particularly in Slovakia, 
Poland, and Latvia) may hinder the development of rural areas. 
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Further, it has to be noted that an important direct implication of the new regulations is 
that they increase transactions costs to land market participants. Land market transaction costs 
include various direct costs (fees and various payments such as notary charges) incurred by 
sellers and buyers to prepare all the required documentation, opportunity costs of time spent 
on arranging the necessary administrative procedures, and the cost associated with the 
uncertainty of completing the sales transaction. From this perspective, the new regulations 
make land transactions more costly and limit the potential of land markets to facilitate 
reallocation of resources towards more efficient uses. This adverse effect may be reflected in 
unrealized productivity gains in agriculture ultimately leading to lower land prices. In that 
case, landowners will lose from the new regulations, because the land will be devaluated and 
the land market will become thinner (less liquid). Of particular concern should be the fact that 
potential investors/farmers with a higher land market productivity may be excluded from land 
markets (especially in Slovakia). 
On the other hand though, the new regulations, perhaps unintentionally, increase the 
transparency of land sales transactions and thus may improve the information access to 
market participants. The implications of a greater transparency are not only at the local level, 
but also at national or international levels, as sales offers need to be announced publicly and 
are freely available to all potential buyers. 
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Table 1. Summary of new restrictions on land sales transactions in Romania, Slovakia, Poland and Latvia 
 Romania Slovakia Poland Latvia 
Pre-emption right 
holders 
Family relatives,* co-owners, 
tenants, neighbors, the 
Romanian state 
Group 1: family relatives, co-owners 
and farmers from the village** 
Group 2: farmers/farm 
labor/agricultural companies from 
neighboring village or other locations 
conducting their activity at least three 
years and with at least ten years 
residence in Slovakia 
Private transaction: tenants; neighboring individual 
farmer; APA;*** 
Public-private transaction: priority right is with the 
agric. cooperative if it holds a dominion of the land, 
tenant if the tenancy lasts for at least three years, 
those in charge of special economic zones  
Co-owners, current owners, or the last 
tenant of land that has applied for 
CAP direct payments, Latvian Land 
Fund 
Which offer needs 
to be announced? 
All sales offers Land sold to another type of buyers 
than Group 1  
Private transaction: there is no requirement to 
announce the offer publicly. Yet, seller needs to 
notify the pre-emption right holders about the sale; 
further seller needs to inform local APA office 
which establishes whether the land can be sold 
Public-private transaction: all sales offers 
All sales offers 
Where is the offer 
announced? 
Website and in the premises of 
local city hall, and on the 
website of the central and 
regional  offices of the Ministry 
of Agriculture 
Online registry administered by the 
Ministry of Agriculture and on the 
public board in the village where the 
land is located 
For public-private transaction the offer needs to be 
announced in accordance with a local custom; in a 
local agricultural chamber and a local municipality 
council; if the value of land exceeds the value of 
10 thousand quintiles of rye the offer has to be 
announced in newspapers with at least voivodship 
scope 
Not specified 
Duration of the 
publication of the 
offer 
30 days: local authority 
15 days: regional/ central 
authorities 
At least 15 days Public-private transaction: 14 days before putting 








Within the period established in the 
offer 
Either within the period established in the offer or, 
if the period is not specified, within one month 
Within the period established in the 
offer 
Who checks the 
validity of the 
transaction? 
Regional authority: if  area 
smaller than 30 ha; 
Central authority: if area larger 
than 30 ha; 
Local city hall: if pre-emption 
right holders do not exercise 
their right  
Regional (district) authorities  Regional authorities (both local municipalities as 
well as regional office of APA) 
Local authority (novada dome) 
Can land be sold on 
open market 
Yes, if pre-emption right 
holders do not exercise their 
right 
Yes, if pre-emption right holders do 
not exercise their right 
Yes, if pre-emption right holders do not exercise 
their right 
Yes, if pre-emption right holders do 
not exercise their right 
Which buyers Non-EU citizens without Individuals or companies from EU Private transaction: Non-EU citizens. EU citizens Individuals or companies from other 
cannot acquire land permanent residence in EU with permanent residence in Slovakia 
of less than ten years but not earlier 
than six months from the date the 
announcement was published. 
Also, a country (or its citizens) that 
does not allow Slovak citizens to buy 
land in that country. 
not being an individual farmer in Poland have to 
get special permission.   
Public-private transaction: Land administered by 
APA cannot be sold but only rented in the next five 
years. Further, APA may reserve that participation 
in tenders may be limited to a particular group of 
people; in addition, it is assumed that after the 
expiration of the moratorium on public land sales, 
public land would not be sold to a person if his/her 
total owned land is larger than 300 ha, or if his/her 
total purchases from APA are greater than 300 ha. 
countries than EU, EEA or Swiss 
Confederation. 
Individuals or companies from EU in 
the following situations: 
-if not registered within the State 
Revenue Service (VID) as persons 
who perform economic activities in 
Latvia;  
- if cannot prove that during the last 
three years have received CAP direct 
payments, or that their agricultural 
income was more than 30% of total 
income, and have agricultural 
education 
- if not commencing agricultural 
activities on the acquired land 




 Transaction between family relatives is not subject to the new regulation in Romania; 
**
 farmers conducting their activity at least three years in the cadastral zone 
where offered land is located; 
***
 many exemptions exist though to this pre-emption right (for example, this right does not apply if sellers' relatives buy the land; by an 
individual farmers who would like to increase his/her farm within the limit up to 300 ha; or by the State Treasury). 
Table 2. Farm structure in countries under study (2013) 
Share of land use in total agricultural area (%) Average farms size (ha) 
Family farms Corporate farms . Family farms Corporate farms 
Latvia 87 13 20 176 
Poland 91 9 9 361 
Romania 56 44 2 207 
Slovakia 19 81 18 559 
Source: Eurostat 
Table 3. Land market regulations in the EU 
Type of regulation Countries 
Measures to protect the tenant 
Maximum rental prices  Austria, Belgium, France, the Netherlands 
Minimum rental contract duration Austria, Belgium, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, 
Slovenia 
Automatic rental contract renewal Belgium, the Czech Republic, France, Germany, Italy, the 
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Slovenia 
Conditions for rental contract termination Belgium, France, the Netherlands 
Pre-emption buying right of the tenant  Belgium, France, Italy, Portugal, Sweden, Hungary, Lithuania, 
the Netherlands, Slovenia 
Measures to protect the small owner-cultivator 
Requirements for land owner  Austria, Denmark, Spain, Hungary 
(Maximum) sales price regulations  Austria, France  
Pre-emption right-for neighboring farmers  France, Italy, Portugal, Hungary, Slovenia 
Maximum transacted / Owned Area Denmark, France, Hungary, Lithuania 
Measures to protect the (non-farm) land owner 
Maximum duration of rental contract Denmark, Finland, Sweden, Hungary  
Minimum rental prices  Austria, the Czech Republic, France, the Netherlands 
Measures to prevent land fragmentation 
Regulations on pre-emption buying rights of 
the co-owner 
Italy, Portugal, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Lithuania, Slovenia 
Minimum plot size Germany, Bulgaria, Estonia, Lithuania 
Source: Swinnen, Van Herck, and  Vranken (2014a). 









Seller's transaction costs RO + – 0, + 0, – 
SK + – + – 
PL + – 0, + 0, – 
LV + – 0, + 0, – 
Buyer's transaction costs RO – – + 0 
SK – – ++ – – 
PL – – ++ – 
LV – – ++ – 
Higher transparency RO + + 
0, + + 
SK 0, + 0, + 
0, + 
0 
PL 0, + 0, + 
0, + 
0 
LV + + 
0, + 
0, + 
Overall impact RO + 0, + 0, + 0, + 
SK – – + – 
PL – – + – 
LV – – + – 
Notes: '+' means increase, '–' decrease and '0' no change; two signs (e.g. '++', '– –') mean greater impact than one 
sign (e.g. '+', '–'); two different results (e.g., '+, 0') indicate the variation of the expected effect. 
Europe Direct is a service to help you find answers to your questions about the European Union 
Free phone number (*): 00 800 6 7 8 9 10 11 
(*) Certain mobile telephone operators do not allow access to 00 800 numbers or these calls may be billed. 
A great deal of additional information on the European Union is available on the Internet. 
It can be accessed through the Europa server http://europa.eu 
How to obtain EU publications 
Our publications are available from EU Bookshop (http://bookshop.europa.eu), 
where you can place an order with the sales agent of your choice. 
http://www.eeri.eu/  
The Publications Office has a worldwide network of sales agents. 
You can obtain their contact details by sending a fax to (352) 29 29-42758. 
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